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INTRODUCTION 
Scientific innovation is crucial to the prosperity, security, and health of 
a nation.1 During the founding years of the United States, political leaders 
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 1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Medal of Science and National 
Medal of Technology and Innovation Ceremony (Oct. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-National-Medal-of-
Science-and-National-Medal-of-Technology-and-Innovation-Ceremony/ (“Science is more essential 
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realized the need for such innovation and created the patent law system2 as 
a means of protecting American citizens.3 The major goals of the United 
States patent law system are to provide the public with cutting-edge 
scientific discoveries and to enlighten the public as to how these 
discoveries can benefit society.4 
In modern America, a substantial amount of patent protection is sought 
for inventions relating to the pharmaceutical industry. In recent decades, 
the pharmaceutical industry has expanded rapidly as researchers invent 
new and more effective drugs and products.5 The average life expectancy 
and quality of life of United States citizens has drastically increased in the 
past century, largely due to pharmaceutical innovation.6 Nonetheless, 
nearly sixty million people die each year, with many of these deaths caused 
by problems that pharmaceutical companies are striving to cure.7 
In the late 1970s, scientific researchers began to view genetic material 
as a means of developing treatment options for a variety of human 
diseases.8 Today, approximately two-thirds of the new drugs that hit the 
market have been influenced by genetic research,9 and genetic material has 
                                                                                                                     
for our prosperity, our security, and our health, and our way of life than it has ever been.”); see also 
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The future of 
the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of industry 
depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual property.”). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective . . . Discoveries”). See generally Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 
(allowing federal protection for scientific inventions). 
 3. See George Washington, First Annual Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in 30 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at 
491, 491–92 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (stating that the general public’s “safety and interest 
require[] that they should promote such manufactories[] as tend to render them independent on 
others for essential, particularly military supplies”). 
 4. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (discussing 
the purpose of the United States patent system). 
 5. See Gregory J. Higby, From Compounding to Caring: An Abridged History of American 
Pharmacy, in PHARMACEUTICAL CARE 19, 36–37 (Calvin H. Knowlton & Richard P. Penna eds., 2d 
ed. 2003) (discussing the increase of pharmaceutical inventions in the 1950s). 
 6. See LAURA B. SHRESTHA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32792, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2–5 (2006) (showing that the average American life expectancy has increased by 
nearly thirty years in the past century and citing medical advances as a reason for these decreased 
mortality rates); see also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Kaiser Public Opinion Spotlight: 
Views on Prescription Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1 (Apr. 2008), available at 
http://www.kff.org/spotlight/rxdrugs/upload/Rx_Drugs.pdf [hereinafter Kaiser] (indicating that 
most American adults take prescription drugs and that a vast majority of Americans believe that 
prescription drugs improve quality of life). 
 7. See DEP’T OF HEALTH STATISTICS & INFORMATICS IN THE INFO., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE 
GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE: 2004 UPDATE 8, 22 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/ 
healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GBD_report2004update_full.pdf (indicating that rates of 
mortality due to noncommunicable diseases are expected to increase in the coming decades). 
 8. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
PATENT LAW 59 (3d ed. 2009). 
 9. See Andrew Pollack, The Genome at 10: Awaiting the Genome Payoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 
15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/business/15genome.html 
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been linked to more than 850 human diseases.10 Additionally, 
biotechnology investors have indicated—with their pocketbooks—that 
they believe that the future of disease prevention and treatment is tied to 
genetic research.11 Despite the fact that pharmaceutical companies have 
invested billions of dollars for development of gene-related cures and 
treatments for human illnesses,12 the general public and the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York wish to rein in the 
intellectual property rights afforded to these companies.13 Furthermore, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) is 
divided in regard to DNA patentability14 and has indicated that any change 
to DNA-patenting policy would be most effectively propagated 
legislatively.15 
In our society, there is a large disconnect between the supposed 
interests of the public and the pharmaceutical industry. In general, the 
public desires medical innovation but prefers to benefit from these medical 
advances at minimal cost.16 Meanwhile, the pharmaceutical industry is 
merely a business, and businesses are built on profit maximization.17 
Because the pharmaceutical business is premised on seemingly altruistic 
purposes, the industry is an easy target for individuals who cannot afford 
its services.18 Due to the nature of the pharmaceutical industry, profit 
                                                                                                                     
(indicating that the Research and Development President at Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Research 
Executive Vice President at Roche have both proclaimed that two-thirds of newly developed drugs 
have been influenced by genetic research). 
 10. See Nicholas Wade, A Decade Later, Gene Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. TIMES, June 
13, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/health/research/13genome.html? 
pagewanted=1&ref=business. 
 11. See Pollack, supra note 9 (stating that Merck recently purchased a small gene research 
pharmaceutical company for $1.1 billion). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that isolated human DNA is not patentable). 
 14. See infra Section I.B. 
 15. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), No. 
2010-1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *66 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (stating that if DNA-
related inventions are to be excluded from patentability, “the decision must come not from the 
courts, but from Congress”); id. at *98 (Moore, J., concurring) (basing his opinion partly on the 
“belief that we should defer to Congress, [he believes] . . . settled expectations tip the scale in favor 
of [DNA] patentability”). 
 16. See Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining that most Americans attribute improved quality 
of life to advances in drug development, yet nearly half of surveyed Americans are displeased with 
pharmaceutical companies because they are “too focused on profits”). 
 17. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the 
Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2011) (discussing businesses 
manipulating output and pricing structures in order to maximize profit). 
 18. See Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, In Costly Cancer Drug, Hope and a Dilemma, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/health/06avastin.html 
(reporting that “patient advocates are . . . troubled by very expensive treatments”); see also Malcolm 
Gladwell, High Prices: How to Think About Prescription Drugs, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2004, 
at 86, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/10/25/041025crat_atlarge (discussing 
the commonly held viewpoint that “drug companies are troubled and corrupt”). 
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maximization benefits the general public. Therefore, decreasing 
pharmaceutical company profits necessarily has the unintended side effect 
of decreasing public health benefits.19 This complicated equilibrium has 
been convoluted further by the district court ruling, and the subsequent 
divided C.A.F.C. ruling, in the recent Myriad case.20 
This Note will explore the seemingly contradictory interests of the 
general public, the pharmaceutical industry, and the research community 
regarding human gene patents. Part I will look at the recent Myriad 
decisions in light of previous beliefs about the patentability of genetic 
material. Part II will examine the effect of gene patenting on scientific 
research and innovation. Parts III and IV will explore the effect of gene 
patents on both the general public and the pharmaceutical industry, and 
will seek to understand the belief dissonance between these two factions. 
Part V will consider how Congress has handled similar problems in the 
past through legislation, specifically in regards to plant patents and 
biological drugs. Part VI will discuss the possibility of finding a solution to 
the gene patent problem that satisfies the research community, the general 
public, and the pharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, this Note will analyze 
the success of prior legislation in order to propose a course of action that 
will appease all parties involved in the human gene patenting debate. 
I.  THE MYRIAD CASE 
Congress has statutorily provided that anyone who “invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent.”21 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,22 the first Supreme Court 
case involving patentability of genetic material, the Court ruled that 
genetically engineered bacteria were patentable subject matter.23 The 
Chakrabarty Court focused on the Congressional intent of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
in trying to decide whether genetically engineered bacteria were included 
within the statutory meaning of “‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of 
matter.’”24 Because the patent law system was created with the idea that 
“ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement,”25 the Court concluded 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 849, 849–50 (2002) (citing David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological 
Change in Medicine Worth It?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 11, 23 (2001)) (implying that technological 
innovation is slowed by public backlash against the pharmaceutical industry). 
 20. Myriad II, No. 2010-1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011); 
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 22.  447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 23. Id. at 318 (holding that Congress intended for 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be interpreted such that 
genetically modified bacteria are patentable subject matter). 
 24. Id. at 307 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 25. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 
(H.A. Washington ed., 1853)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Graham v. John Deere 
4
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that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is made 
by man.”26 Including genetically engineered bacteria within the definition 
of “manufacture” or “composition of matter” was therefore deemed 
consistent with the purpose of the patent law system.27 The Court 
concluded by urging Congress to legislatively address the patentability of 
genetic advances if the Court had misinterpreted the patentability statute.28 
While Congress has failed to address the issue of human gene 
patentability, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
directly addressed the issue in the 2001 version of its Utility Examination 
Guidelines. Based on the updated guidelines, the mere discovery of a 
genetic sequence is not sufficient to obtain a patent.29 However, if the gene 
sequence has a defined utility, then genetic material that has been isolated 
and purified is patentable, because it does not appear in nature in an 
isolated and purified form.30 Even with this limitation in place, thousands 
of patents relating to genetic material have been granted by the USPTO.31 
When the validity of genetic material patents has been questioned, courts 
have generally held that “pharmacological activity of any compound is 
obviously beneficial to the public,”32 and therefore upheld patents on 
functional genetic material.33 Prior to the Myriad rulings, it was generally 
accepted by scholars that full-length genes were patentable subject matter 
if the gene had a known function and use.34 It is within this context that the 
Myriad case began making its way through the United States judicial 
system. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966) (describing Thomas Jefferson as the “first administrator of our patent 
system” and discussing Jefferson’s philosophy on the purpose of patent law (quoting P.J. Federico, 
Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 237, 238 (1936)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 26. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. 
NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also noted that “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas [are] not patentable.” Id. 
 27. Id. at 309–10. 
 28. Id. at 317–18. 
 29. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Brief of Amicus Curiae Genetic Alliance in Opposition to Certain Positions of the 
Plaintiffs at 9, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
 32. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding that research tests 
indicating the presence of pharmacological activity is evidence of an invention’s utility). 
 33. Compare In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (indicating that absence of 
pharmacological activity reduces the likelihood that an invention has “utility”), with Ex parte Bhat, 
No. 2008-003946, 2009 WL 1742172, at *4 (B.P.A.I. June 16, 2009) (holding that genetic material 
with a known function satisfies the utility standard). 
 34. See, e.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes 
and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 
766 (2000) (discussing the patentability of genetic material). 
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A.  Myriad I: United States District Court for the Southern  
District of New York 
 
The human genome contains between 20,000 and 25,000 functional35 
genes.36 In the mid-1990s, researchers discovered a pair of genes, BRCA1 
and BRCA2, that are responsible for proper maintenance of breast and 
ovarian cells within the female human body.37 Mutations to these genes 
result in a significantly increased likelihood that a woman will develop 
breast or ovarian cancer.38 Armed with the knowledge of the presence of 
these genetic mutations, a patient can develop a proactive approach to the 
prevention and treatment of breast or ovarian cancer. Following 
identification of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, Myriad Genetics, in 
collaboration with the University of Utah Research Foundation, was able to 
isolate these genes from the human body and develop a means of testing 
patients for the presence of mutations to these genes.39 Myriad Genetics 
subsequently obtained U.S. and foreign patent protection on the isolated 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes40 and diagnostic methods of testing for 
mutations to these genes.41  
In 2009, the Association for Molecular Pathology filed a complaint in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting 
that Myriad Genetics’ patents were unenforceable because isolated human 
genes are unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.42 In 
analyzing the patentability of the claims, the court divided the claims into 
two subsets: “composition claims”43 and “method claims.”44 Under 35 
U.S.C. § 101, a claimed invention is patentable if it “possesses utility” and 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Generally, genes function by producing proteins that direct physiological activities in the 
body. “Functional” genes are therefore defined as genes that ultimately lead to the production of 
proteins.  
 36. Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of 
the Human Genome, 431 NATURE 931, 943 (2004). 
 37. See Yoshio Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
Susceptibility Gene BRCA1, 266 SCI. 66 (1994) (discussing the identification of the BRCA1 gene 
and linking the gene to breast and ovarian tissue); Richard Wooster et al., Identification of the 
Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene BRCA2, 378 NATURE 789 (1995) (discussing the identification 
of the BRCA2 gene and linking the gene to breast tissue). 
 38. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (indicating that women with mutations to both the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes face an 85% increase in the likelihood of developing breast cancer and a 50% 
increase in the likelihood of developing ovarian cancer). 
 39. Id. at 184, 202–03. 
 40. See U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995) (patenting the isolated BRCA1 gene); 
U.S. Patent No. 6,124,104 (filed Mar. 20, 1998) (patenting the isolated BRCA2 gene). 
 41. See U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995) (patenting a method of testing for 
mutations in the BRCA1 gene); U.S. Patent No. US 6,895,337 B1 (filed Oct. 15, 2002) (patenting a 
method of testing for mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes). 
 42. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
 43. Id. at 220. 
 44. Id. at 232. 
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“constitutes statutory subject matter.”45 On all claims at issue, “it [was] 
undisputed that [the inventions] possess[ed] utility.”46 Therefore, the sole 
question facing the court was whether the claimed inventions were a 
“product[] of nature,” and therefore excluded from patentability.47 
Myriad Genetics’ composition claims were directed to isolated DNA 
molecules coding for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins. The Myriad I court 
defined isolated DNA as “a segment of DNA nucleotides existing separate 
from other cellular components normally associated with native DNA,” 
and recognized that such isolated DNA is not typically found in nature.48 
However, in analyzing the patentability of Myriad’s composition claims, 
the court created a new test, a Markedly Different Test, to determine if the 
claims fell within the products of nature exception to patentability.49 
Despite recognizing that chemical bonds must be broken and reformed in 
the creation of isolated DNA,50 the court ruled that Myriad’s composition 
claims “merely constitute[] a difference in purity that cannot serve to 
establish subject matter patentability.”51 Because the court viewed 
Myriad’s composition claims as merely higher purity versions of native 
DNA, the “isolated DNA [was] not markedly different from native DNA” 
and was therefore “unpatentable subject matter.”52 In essence, Myriad’s 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Id. at 220 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. In general, courts have deemed inventions to be patentable unless they relate to a 
“law[] of nature, physical phenomena, [or] abstract idea[].” Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the 
Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 
778 (2008) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 48. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 217. 
 49. Id. at 227–28 (stating that the composition claims are patentable if the isolated DNA has 
“markedly different characteristics” from DNA found in nature (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 50. Id. at 230 (stating that the claims at issue only involve BRCA1 and BRCA2 exon regions 
of gene sequences). For a discussion of why chemical bonds must be broken and reformed in order 
to isolate only exons, see id. at 197–98. Because chemical bonds are broken and reformed in the 
process of isolating exons, the process is more aptly described as a chemical reaction, not a 
chemical purification. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/reaction (last visited July 8, 2011) (defining “reaction” as “a process involving change in atomic 
nuclei”). 
 51. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 229–30. The court implied that removing DNA from other 
cellular components is “purification” because of the type of chemical bonds that exist between DNA 
and cellular components. See id. at 195–96 & n.11 (stating that the “disassociation of histone 
proteins from DNA by [a] high salt solution[] indicat[es] lack of covalent bond[s] between DNA 
and histones”) (citing BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 208 fig. 4–24 (4th 
ed. 2002))). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “covalent chemical bonds . . . hold DNA 
itself together,” yet failed to acknowledge that isolating only a portion of native DNA necessarily 
involves breaking chemical covalent bonds. Id. Because covalent chemical bonds are being broken, 
the process of isolating DNA should be categorized as a “chemical reaction” rather than a chemical 
purification. It is well-established in the scientific community that a chemical reaction results in the 
formation of a different substance than the one present prior to the reaction. 
 52. Id. at 232. See supra notes 50–51 for a discussion of why isolated DNA is not merely a 
purified version of native DNA. 
7
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claims were nothing more than a “product of nature.” This holding was 
contrary to prior case law indicating that naturally occurring chemicals, if 
isolated and purified, represent patentable subject matter.53 The court 
distinguished DNA from other chemical compounds, largely based on the 
“biological realit[y]” that DNA has a more important function than other 
chemical compounds.54 
Myriad Genetics’ method claims were directed toward a process of 
analyzing DNA sequence data to determine if a patient is predisposed to 
breast or ovarian cancer.55 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit had previously created the “machine-or-transformation” 
test, which states that “an application of a law of nature or mathematical 
formula to a known structure or process”56 is patentable only if the process 
“(1) . . . is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) . . . transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing.”57 The Myriad I court 
applied the machine-or-transformation test to the claims at issue and held 
the claims were unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The 
court held that, even if the claims “were construed to include [a] physical 
transformation,”58 they would have been unpatentable nevertheless, 
because the transformation was not “[t]he essence of what [was] 
claimed.”59 Notably, following the Myriad I ruling, the Supreme Court 
harshly criticized the exclusive application of the machine-or-
transformation test to method claims60 and indicated that constraining 
method claim patentability to only those claims that can pass the machine-
or-transformation test “violates [patent law] statutory interpretation 
principles.”61  
In holding that most of Myriad Genetics’ claims62 were invalid,63 the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
departed from the commonly held view on the patentability of genetic 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (finding 
that isolated and purified adrenaline is patentable subject matter), rev’d in part, 196 F. 596 (2d Cir. 
1912). 
 54. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
 55.  Id. at 213–14. 
 56. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. at 954. 
 58. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 236–37. 
 59. Id. at 236. 
 60. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010) (stating that “[t]he Court of Appeals 
incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the 
exclusive test” for determining whether a claimed method is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 61. Id. at 3226. In light of the recent Supreme Court Bilski ruling, the Myriad I court erred in 
adopting a strict application of the machine-or-transformation test to Myriad Genetics’ method 
claims. 
 62. Judge Sweet ruled on the patentability of fifteeen claims spread across seven different 
Myriad Genetics patents. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 
 63. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 238. 
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material.64 Prior to the ruling, isolated genetic material with a known 
function was deemed patentable subject matter.65 The Myriad I decision 
was not only contrary to previous ideas regarding the patentability of 
genetic material, but was viewed by some as being “contrary to 200 years 
of natural products patenting.”66 
B.  Myriad II: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
On October 22, 2010, Myriad Genetics appealed the Myriad I ruling to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.67 On appeal, the 
Department of Justice filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. 
government supporting a policy change regarding the patentability of 
human genes.68 The government stated that, “contrary to the longstanding 
practice of the [USPTO], . . . isolated genomic DNA . . . is not patent-
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”69 Despite acknowledging 
that isolated DNA does not exist in nature,70 the government largely agreed 
with the final holding in Myriad I. While the government disagreed with 
the breadth of the court’s reasoning,71 it suggested that other patent law 
statutes, such as 35 U.S.C. § 103, might be better served to invalidate 
claims related to genetic material.72  
On July 29, 2011, despite the U.S. government’s position on the 
patentability of genetic material, the C.A.F.C. ruled that isolated DNA is 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.73 While the court 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Prior to the court’s ruling, some viewed the lawsuit as frivolous in light of Supreme Court 
precedent. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, ACLU Files Frivolous Lawsuit Challenging Patents, 
IPWATCHDOG.COM (May 14, 2009), http://ipwatchdog.com/2009/05/14/aclu-files-frivolous-lawsuit-
challenging-patents/id=3417. 
 65. See Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 29, at 1093 (stating that genetic material 
does not appear in nature in the isolated or purified form and that it may be patentable if it has a 
defined utility). 
 66. Remarks on Science Friday: Gene Patenting by Kevin Noonan (National Public Radio 
broadcast Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sciencefriday.com/program/archives/ 200912112 
(discussing the pros and cons of gene patenting in general). For an example of a “natural products” 
patent issued in 1873, see U.S. Patent No. 141072 (filed May 9, 1873). 
 67. Brief for Appellants, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
No. 2010-1406, 2010 WL 4600106 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2010). 
 68. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 2010-1406, 2010 WL 4853320 (Fed. 
Cir. Oct. 29, 2010).  
 69. Id. at *18. 
 70. Id. at *21. 
 71. See id. at *9–10 (stating that cDNAs, vectors, recombinant plasmids, chimeric proteins, 
vaccines, and genetically modified crops are patentable subject matter). 
 72. Id. at *17 (stating that claims to genetic material could be rejected for being obvious). 
According to 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention is not patentable “if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 
William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Judicial 
Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 237 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), No. 2010-
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determined that isolated DNA is patentable, a divided three-judge panel 
released a “majority” opinion,74 a concurring opinion, and a dissenting 
opinion. In the majority opinion, Judge Lourie, based on a well-reasoned 
understanding of the underlying chemistry of isolated DNA, discussed at 
length the structural distinctions between isolated and native DNA. Even 
though isolated DNA may function similarly to native DNA, it is “a 
distinct chemical entity” that does not exist in nature and therefore is 
eligible for patent protection.75 Furthermore, because of the distinct 
structural nature of isolated DNA, it should always be patentable under 35 
U.S.C. § 101. 
In contrast with the structural differences highlighted by Judge Lourie, 
Judge Moore believes that the functional differences between isolated and 
native DNA, in some circumstances, can enable isolated DNA to be patent 
eligible.76 According to Judge Moore, the structural differences at issue 
“do not . . . necessarily make[] isolated DNA [patentable].”77 Rather, the 
important question is “whether these differences impart a new utility” to 
the claimed DNA sequence.78 Judge Moore’s restrictive view of patentable 
DNA, which is consistent with the USPTO view, imposes a significant 
limitation upon the scope of patentable material as defined by the majority 
opinion. 
Lastly, Judge Bryson’s dissenting opinion largely aligns with the 
opinion of the Department of Justice. Judge Bryson agrees with the holding 
and reasoning of the District Court opinion, but limits the breadth of Judge 
Sweet’s definition of unpatentable DNA.79 In essence, Judge Bryson 
believes that isolated DNA is the same as “that which appear[s] 
in . . . living human beings” and is therefore unpatentable.80 
While each member of the three-judge panel disagrees about the 
patentability, or reasoning therefore, of isolated DNA, all three judges 
agree regarding the patentability of Myriad’s medical diagnostic claims. 
The C.A.F.C. panel ruled that the majority of Myriad’s method claims 
were directed to unpatentable subject matter.81 Despite the Supreme 
Court’s Bilski decision,82 the C.A.F.C., like the District Court, applied the 
                                                                                                                     
1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *63 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011). 
 74. What the judges refer to as the “majority” opinion is actually the controlling opinion of a 
single judge.  
 75. Myriad II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *57, *60, *63.  
 76. Id. at *92 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at *91. 
 78. Id. at *92. 
 79. Judge Bryson, like the other two judges on the panel, believes that cDNA is patentable 
subject matter. Id. at *61 (Lourie, J., majority opinion), *75-76 (Moore, J., concurring), *117 
(Bryson, J., dissenting). 
 80. See id. at *117–42. 
 81. Id. at *67–68 (Lourie, J., majority opinion) 
 82. See supra Section I.A. 
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machine-or-transformation test to the claims at issue.83 In recent years, the 
appropriate test used to assess the patentability of method claims has been 
a source of contention between the C.A.F.C. and the Supreme Court. Prior 
to the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision, the C.A.F.C, in Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,84 applied the machine-
or-transformation test to medical diagnostic method claims similar to those 
in the Myriad patents.85 In light of Bilksi v. Kappos, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the Prometheus case, vacated the judgment, and 
remanded the case back to the C.A.F.C.86 On remand, the Federal Circuit 
reiterated its initial reasoning and reached the same result.87 In light of the 
C.A.F.C.’s refusal to adopt the underlying principles articulated in Bilksi, 
on June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court again granted a writ of certiorari in 
Prometheus.88 
Until the Supreme Court rules on Prometheus, the state of the law 
concerning medical diagnostic claims, such as those in Myriad II, will 
remain unclear. Based on the Supreme Court’s continued involvement with 
Prometheus, it is unlikely that the machine-or-transformation test used in 
Myriad II was the appropriate test for determining patentability of medical 
diagnostic method claims. Regardless of the C.A.F.C.’s current opinion 
regarding the unpatentability of Myriad’s method claims, until the Supreme 
Court issues an opinion in Prometheus, the viability of Myriad’s method 
claims as Myriad II moves forward will be unresolved. 
In light of the recent stance taken by the United States government in 
the Myriad II case and the divergent opinions of the three C.A.F.C. judges, 
it is evident that the patent law system as it relates to human genes is in a 
state of uncertainty. Based on the non-consensus of the C.A.F.C. in regard 
to the scope of DNA patentability and the dynamic state of the law in 
regard to medical diagnostic claims, it is likely that the Myriad II opinion 
will be appealed.89 Even if Myriad II is appealed, the historical reluctance 
of the courts and the USPTO to effectuate a change in gene patent policy90 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Myriad II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *66 (Lourie, J., majority opinion) (“[W]e 
conclude that all but one of Myriad’s method claims . . . fail the machine-or-transformation test.”) 
 84. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The claim at issue is directed to “determining the level of 
6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder[.]” Id. at 1340. 
 85. Id. at 1342. 
 86. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). 
 87. Id. at 1355 (“We do not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the Court’s 
Bilski decision dictates a wholly different analysis or a different result on remand.”). 
 88. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3710 (June 20, 2011) (No. 10-1150). 
 89. See Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Federal Circuit Issues Mixed Decision on Myriad Claims, 
PHARMAPATENTS (June 30, 2011), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/federal-circuit-
decisions/federal-circuit-decides-myriad-oks-isolated-dna-claims/ (“It is likely that . . . Plaintiffs-
Appellees will . . . petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.”). 
 90. See supra notes 21–34 and accompanying text (discussing the willingness of the USPTO 
to grant patents related to genetic material, and the Supreme Court’s position that genetic material 
patents are valid). 
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means that any change to the current system can be most effectively 
accomplished through legislation.91 
The blanket ban on patentability of isolated human genes suggested by 
the United States is a dangerous proposition. The history of patent law 
teaches us that the inability to obtain market exclusivity disincentivizes 
innovation.92 “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents . . . is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of . . . inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”93 If 
pharmaceutical companies cannot make a personal financial gain from 
human genetic research, then the eventual result will be a decrease in 
health benefits to the public. Ultimately, any successful gene patent 
legislation will take into account the interest of all involved parties: 
scientific researchers, the general public, and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Myriad Genetics’ patents, and gene patents generally, have been a 
source of controversy in the research community,94 among academic 
scholars,95 and throughout the general public.96 Scientific researchers 
worry that their research objectives will be constrained by the inability to 
incorporate patented genes into their research projects.97 The result of 
impairing scientific research is a decrease in the pace of scientific 
innovation.98 Academic scholars argue that the disconnect between the 
legislative branch of government, the judicial branch of government, and 
the patent law system creates a field that lacks clarity and breeds 
uncertainty.99 Because of this, many believe that the patent law system 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Up to this point, one of the problems relating to genetic material is that the “dramatic 
advances in genetics research have far outpaced lawmakers’ ability to address its social, ethical, and 
legal implications.” Patricia Alten, GINA: A Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Solution in 
Search of a Problem, 61 FLA. L. REV. 379, 381 (2009). 
 92. See infra Part V. 
 93. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 94. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (arguing that gene patents 
simultaneously spur innovation and inhibit scientific research). 
 95. See James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could 
Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 105–06 (F. Scott 
Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing the pros and cons of patenting genes); E. Richard Gold & Julia 
Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS MED. S39, S44–48 (2010) 
(discussing the impact of the BRCA1and BRCA2 patents on scientific research and the general 
public). 
 96. See BRCA: Genes and Patents, ACLU (May 27, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/free-
speech/brca-genes-and-patents#09 (arguing that the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene patents undermine 
“bodily integrity[] and women’s health”). 
 97. See Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical 
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 8 (2003) (reporting that scientific 
researchers feel that gene patents increase the costs of research). 
 98. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 699. 
 99. Holman & Munzer, supra note 34, at 765 (“[T]here is no straightforward legal reason to 
deny patent protection to all ESTs.”) 
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should be altered either legislatively,100 judicially,101 or departmentally.102 
The general public is concerned that Myriad Genetics’ monopoly over the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes will result in decreased quality of testing 
procedures103 and an inability to obtain testing due to prohibitively high 
costs to the patient.104 Parts II through III explore these concerns in more 
detail. 
II.  THE EFFECT OF GENE PATENTING ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
The effect of gene patenting on scientific research is a hotly debated 
issue. Gene patenting opponents believe that patenting human genes 
inhibits scientific research, which is ultimately detrimental to society. 
Conversely, gene patenting proponents believe that patenting human genes 
stimulates scientific research, leading to a multitude of societal benefits. 
The remainder of this Part explores the arguments put forth by both sides 
in the gene patenting debate relating to the affect of gene patenting on 
scientific research.   
A.  Opponents of Gene Patenting 
The main argument put forth by researchers who oppose the idea of 
human gene patenting is that gene patenting inhibits scientific research. 
This problem relates primarily to what has been termed the “tragedy of the 
anticommons.”105 It is widely accepted among the scientific community 
that genes rarely function independently, but rather work in concert with 
other genes.106 Because there are a multitude of functional genes in the 
human body, it is possible that a single strand of DNA could be “owned” 
by several thousand different researchers. In this situation, a researcher 
would be unable to engage in basic genetic research without first obtaining 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY: GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 4–6 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS] 
(recommending to Congress six different ways to alleviate the gene patent problem). 
 101. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 5 (2009) (arguing that the courts are best equipped for handling pharmaceutical patent-
related problems). 
 102. See Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Revisiting the USPTO’s Examination Guidelines for Gene 
Patents: Congressional Inaction, USPTO Restraint, and Judicial Remedy, 6 J. INT’L 
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 204, 207, 209 (2009) (arguing that the USPTO should consider policy 
implications prior to the granting of a patent). 
 103. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 104. Id. at 203–04 (stating that some insurance providers do not cover BRCA1 and BRCA2 
testing procedures and that costs to an uninsured patient surpass $3000 per test).  
 105. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 698. 
 106. See Denise Caruso, A Challenge to Gene Theory, a Tougher Look at Biotech, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 2007, at 33, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/business/yourmoney/01frame. 
html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 (discussing the complexities of the human genome). 
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a license from each of the separate “owners” of that strand.107 For 
researchers engaging in such study, accumulating the licenses to work with 
multiple genes could prove prohibitively costly, both in terms of time and 
money.108 Ultimately, this will lead researchers to engage in a less 
inventive course of study with fewer obstacles.  
Choosing courses of research based on patent avoidance has several 
adverse effects. First, opting not to engage in cutting-edge research hinders 
scientific innovation.109 If fewer scientists are trying to cure a disease, then 
fewer novel discoveries relating to that disease will be made. Additionally, 
some believe that gene patents prevent the improvement of already existing 
medical tests.110 Because gene patents inhibit competition for a period of 
time, the monopoly owner has no incentive to improve already existing 
tests.111 It has also been argued that gene patents negatively impact “the 
culture of science.”112 Forcing scientists to continuously navigate the patent 
landscape is unproductive and negatively “alter[s] the way in which 
researchers study and work with gene sequences.”113 
B.  Proponents of Gene Patenting 
On the contrary, proponents of human gene patenting argue that it does 
not inhibit innovation,114 but rather, stimulates novel discoveries.115 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 699. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 903 (2009) (mentioning that gene patent opponents believe that 
“patent thickets” on genetic material will hinder scientific innovation). 
 110. See Michael Crichton, Op-Ed, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTime
s%20Topics%2fPeople%2fC%2fCrichton%2c%20Michael&oref=slogin (arguing that inventors 
should not be able to obtain patents on genetic material). 
 111. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (arguing that Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents have 
“hindered the ability of patients to receive the highest-quality breast cancer genetic testing and 
[have] impeded the development of improvements to BRCA1/2 genetic testing”). 
 112. Donald Zuhn, Gene Patenting Debate Continues, PATENT DOCS (June 9, 2009, 11:59 
PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/gene-patenting-debate-continues.html (quoting the 
statement of Shobita Parthasarathy, Co-Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy 
Program at the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (discussing the effects of gene patenting on genetic research). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Christopher M. Holman, Trends in Human Gene Patent Litigation, 322 SCI. 198, 198 
(2008) (“[A]ny chilling effect [as a result of gene patents] arises primarily from a perception of risk 
that may not comport with reality.”); Donald Zuhn, Gene Patenting Debate Continues—Round 
Two, PATENT DOCS (Aug. 4, 2009, 6:35 AM), http://www.patentdocs.org/ 2009/08/by-donald-zuhn-
--gene-patenting-its-a-topic-that-public-radio-just-cant-seem-to-get-enough-of-this-summer-in-june-
dr-han.html (“The view that patent law somehow inhibits research is not well founded by attempts 
to look at [the] question in a non-anecdotal way.”). 
 115. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (arguing that gene patents stimulate 
biotechnological breakthroughs); Jim Greenwood, Patents Promote Innovation, USA TODAY, June 
16, 2009, at 8A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20090616/ 
editorial16_st1.art.htm (arguing that a prohibition of gene patents would freeze biomedical 
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Because gene therapies hold the promise of finding cures for many 
problematic diseases, biotechnology companies are investing heavily in 
genetic research.116 This investment has ultimately led to scientific 
innovation that has “improved medical treatments, reduced suffering, and 
saved the lives of millions of Americans.”117 Furthermore, gene patent 
proponents argue that gene patenting does not adversely affect scientific 
research. Regarding the issue of gene patent inhibition of scientific 
advancement, research indicates that academic scientists are rarely affected 
by gene patents.118 Patenting genetic information places it in the public 
domain, thereby providing researchers with information from which they 
can make future discoveries.119 As evidence that gene patents do not inhibit 
scientific research, supporters point to the fact that over 8,000 research 
articles have been published relating to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
associated with Myriad Genetics’ patents.120 It is difficult to argue that the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene patents have inhibited scientific research relating 
to these genes when over 8,000 studies of the genes have been performed 
and published by academic researchers. 
III.  HOW GENE PATENTS AFFECT THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
One of the primary concerns of the general public, relating to human 
gene patents, is the notion that patents are inhibiting citizens from 
obtaining adequate medical treatment.121 Myriad Genetics’ BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 patents give the company a monopoly over the ability to test for 
mutations to these genes. Because of this, “one lab dictates the standards 
                                                                                                                     
innovation). 
 116. See Joseph Fuller & Brock Reeve, Editorial, Will We Lose in the Stem Cell Race?, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201525.html (discussing the billions of dollars that are 
invested in the biotechnology industry). 
 117. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION 3 (2009) (discussing how the lure of patent protection incentivizes biotechnological 
innovation). 
 118. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES 79 (2002) (finding that the number of gene patents 
that pose problems to scientific researchers is substantially smaller than the total number of gene 
patents that have been awarded); JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, 
MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: FINAL REPORT 
TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-RELATED INVENTIONS 37 (2005) (indicating that only 1% of academic 
researchers are adversely affected by patents); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, 
Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021, 1021 (2003) (finding that a more complex 
patent landscape has not precluded research scientists from pursuing worthwhile research projects). 
 119. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 701 (2001) (stating 
that the patent process allows researchers to have access to information that would otherwise remain 
a secret). 
 120. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
 121. Id. 
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for patient care in testing for [breast and ovarian cancer.]”122 The lack of 
competition created by the patents may allow Myriad Genetics to conduct 
lower quality tests and deemphasize the importance of testing accuracy and 
efficiency.123 Furthermore, this monopoly creates a situation in which some 
patients are unable to obtain the genetic testing offered by Myriad 
Genetics. If a patient’s health insurance does not cover the testing, then the 
patient must pay over $3,000 to have Myriad Genetics perform the test.124 
For many people, this price tag is prohibitively high.125 By comparison, 
BRCA1and BRCA2 testing is substantially more affordable in countries that 
refuse to recognize Myriad Genetics’ patents.126 Additionally, countries 
that facilitate competition in BRCA1and BRCA2 testing have been able to 
produce a test that is not only cheaper, but also more accurate.127 
The general public is also concerned about the ethical dilemma caused 
by human gene patenting.128 Gene patenting opponents claim that 
pharmaceutical companies are “patenting life” and that “[you], or someone 
you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never have been 
granted in the first place.”129 Opponents argue that corporations now 
“own” more than twenty percent of all human genes,130 and that these 
genes, though located within every human body, are now the private 
property of patent owners.131 Because of private gene ownership, every 
time two individuals procreate, they are reproducing privately owned genes 
and therefore infringing upon the “invention” of another.132 The ability to 
patent genes affords owners the ability to “influence what technologies 
cost, whose cultural and ethical values they represent, and what aspects of 
the research and development process will be transparent—and to 
whom.”133 
Gene patent proponents argue that the general public’s opinion of gene 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 206, 210. 
 124. Id. at 203. 
 125. Id. at 204. 
 126. Ontario to Offer New Genetic Test for Breast, Ovarian Cancer, CBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 
2003), http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2003/01/06/test_genetic030106.html (stating that the cost of 
genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer in Canada is approximately one-third of the cost of 
testing in the United States). 
 127. Id. (stating that Canadian companies have created a genetic test for breast and ovarian 
cancer that is 10% more accurate than Myriad Genetics’ test). 
 128. See Kathryn Garforth, Life as Chemistry or Life as Biology? An Ethic of Patents on 
Genetically Modified Organisms, in PATENTING LIVES: LIFE PATENTS, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
27, 52 (Johanna Gibson ed., 2008) (arguing that a human gene patent is “unethical because it denies 
the true nature of life and life forms, namely their autonomy, uniqueness and sanctity”). 
 129. Crichton, supra note 110 (arguing that gene patents should be prohibited). 
 130. Denise Caruso, Someone (Other than You) May Own Your Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2007, at 3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/business/yourmoney/28reframe. html. 
 131. Crichton, supra note 110. 
 132. See DAVID KOEPSELL, WHO OWNS YOU?: THE CORPORATE GOLD-RUSH TO PATENT YOUR 
GENES 156 (2009) (arguing that gene patents should be prohibited). 
 133. Caruso, supra note 130. 
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patenting has been swayed by emotional, anecdotal, and inaccurate pleas 
made by gene patent opponents.134 In fact, entire articles have been written 
in an effort to dispel the “[f]alsehoods, [d]istortions and [o]utright [l]ies” 
promulgated by gene patent opponents.135 The sensationalization of 
incorrect information—that human beings are now owned by 
pharmaceutical companies—has led the public to erroneously believe that 
pharmaceutical companies are “going to knock on [their] door . . . and give 
[them] a bill for using [the patent owner’s] gene.”136 By accepting the 
emotional appeal of the opponents, the general public has come to desire a 
result that will ultimately be detrimental to American society. 
IV.  PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES AND GENE PATENTING 
Because pharmaceutical companies are business ventures, they are 
primarily concerned with maximizing profits.137 These companies invest 
more than $50 billion annually in research and development efforts.138 For 
many biotechnology companies, patents are the only means of convincing 
investors to fund lifesaving genetic research. Private investment in 
biotechnology is necessary because of the costly nature, both in terms of 
time and money, of bringing a pharmaceutical product to market.139 It is 
estimated that the process of research, development, and marketing of a 
drug takes an average of nearly ten years140 and between $500 million and 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Gene Quinn, Emotion and Anecdotes Should Not Drive Patent Policy Debate, 
IPWATCHDOG.COM (June 16, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/06/16/emotion-and-anecdotes-
should-not-drive-patent-policy-debate/id=11260 (stating that gene patent opponents use emotional 
appeal to sway the general public). 
 135. See Kevin E. Noonan, Falsehoods, Distortions and Outright Lies in the Gene Patenting 
Debate, PATENT DOCS (June 15, 2009), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/falsehoods-distortions-
and-outright-lies-in-the-gene-patenting-debate.html (arguing that gene patent opponents’ 
propaganda “inhibits reasoned discussion, and . . . suggests . . . that gene patenting is just wrong 
somehow”). 
 136. See Noonan, supra note 66, at 00:21:35. 
 137. See Marlene Cimons & Paul Jacobs, Biotech Battlefield: Profits vs. Public, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 1999, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/feb/21/news/mn-10290 (stating 
that pharmaceutical companies’ first responsibility is to satisfy their shareholders as opposed to 
satisfying the public). But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory 
for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 774 (2007) (discussing the 
possibility of large corporations’ profit maximization being second in importance to their 
commitment to nonshareholders). 
 138. Stifling or Stimulating—The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4 (2007). 
 139. Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, President, Biotechnology Indus. Org., to Howard Coble, 
Chairman, House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. (Mar. 21, 
2002), available at http://bio.org/ip/action/Coble.pdf (discussing the importance of patents to the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 140. See Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between 
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 482 & fig.2 (2008) 
(discussing the time and financial costs of getting both chemical and biological therapies to the 
marketplace). 
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$2 billion to complete.141 Furthermore, because of the difficulty of 
assessing which research projects will be successful, less than one percent 
of biotechnology research ventures ever make it to the marketplace.142 This 
low success rate means that the average biotechnology company will not be 
profitable until their successful products have been on the market for over 
twelve years.143 Indeed, only about five percent of biotechnology 
companies are even profitable at all.144 Because of the high risk and reward 
associated with investing in pharmaceutical companies, the industry would 
not be sustainable without the promise of patent protection for 
biotechnological discoveries.145 Furthermore, disallowing patent protection 
would promote “free-riding” by competitors, which would likely further 
increase the costs of research and development relative to the profit 
gained.146 
To the extent that pharmaceutical companies would continue to develop 
novel therapeutics in the absence of patent protection, these companies 
would likely maintain their profit levels through acquisition of trade 
secrets.147 Withholding scientific information from the public domain 
would detrimentally affect both the pace of scientific innovation and public 
well-being. When drug companies have opted to maintain genetic research 
secrecy as opposed to applying for patents in the past, these situations have 
been met with public outrage.148 Academic researchers have accused these 
companies of costing taxpayers millions of dollars and “critically stalling 
the pace of scientific progress.”149 Critics charged that previous decisions 
to keep genetic research advancement a secret “slowed research by four or 
five years.”150 If all pharmaceutical companies protected their investments 
through trade secrets, the pace of innovation would slow, resulting in 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug 
Development: Is it Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (discussing the financial 
costs of getting a new drug to the marketplace). 
 142. See Grabowski, supra note 19, at 851. 
 143. See id. at 486 & fig.6. 
 144. Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, supra note 120. 
 145. See Grabowski, supra note 19, at 851–52 (stating that patent protection is essential for 
continued investment in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 146. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010) 
(discussing the “free-riding” problem as it relates to copyrights). 
 147. See SACGHS, supra note 100, at 26 (explaining that if patents were not available, 
inventors would seek trade secrets to protect their inventions). For a discussion of the pros and cons 
of trade secrets, see generally David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our 
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007). 
 148. From 1996 to 1998, a life-threatening strain of Staphylococcus aureus killed several 
people around the world, and public health officials became concerned about the possibility of an 
epidemic. Multiple private biotechnology companies had previously spent large amounts of time 
and money to decode the genome for this deadly bacterium, but those companies refused to freely 
share this information with government officials or other scientific researchers. See Cimons & 
Jacobs, supra note 137. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (quoting the statement of Dr. Olaf Schneewind) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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increased public expense, in terms of both financial costs and personal 
well-being. 
In general, the U.S. economy has come to rely heavily on scientific 
innovation.151 Commercialized invention is good for the “long term growth 
and economy” of a country.152 Publicly traded biotechnology companies 
are estimated to be worth around $360 billion,153 a significant portion of 
which is infused into the American economy each year.154 Additionally, the 
biotechnology industry is responsible for the creation of over seven million 
U.S. jobs.155 Thus, the American economy, quality of life,156 and national 
security157 all depend heavily on the success of the biotechnology industry. 
V.  LEARNING FROM HISTORY: WHAT PLANTS AND DRUGS CAN TEACH 
US ABOUT GENES 
A shift in human gene patenting policy seems inevitable.158 Because of 
the importance of the pharmaceutical industry to the American economy, 
health, and way of life, any legislation curtailing the intellectual property 
rights of the industry should simultaneously promote industrial innovation. 
In determining the likely real-world effects of legislation on the 
pharmaceutical industry, it is helpful to look at the effects of previous 
legislation on both innovation and public benefit. 
A.  The History of Agricultural Innovation 
The current controversy regarding the patentability of human genes is 
not the first time that gene patentability has been the subject of national 
debate.159 The plant patentability debate preceded the human gene 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See Lee Bendekgey & Diana Hamlet-Cox, Gene Patents and Innovation, 77 ACAD. MED. 
1373, 1375 (2002). 
 152. Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical 
Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry 85 (Ctr. for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper 
No. 6, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.lawgenecentre.org/ 
Publication%20PDF/OccPap%206%20contents.pdf; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (recognizing that patent law has “a positive effect on society through the 
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations 
by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens”). 
 153. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 2008 at 2 (Roxanna Guilford-
Blake & Debbie Strickland eds., 2008), available at http://bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/BiotechGuide 
2008.pdf. 
 154. Id. at 72. 
 155. K. John Morrow, Jr., Is Building Biotech an Economic Magic Potion?, 20 BIOPHARM. 
INT’L 82, 82 (2007). 
 156. See TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AM. INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: IS THE 
UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE? 1–2 (2005) (discussing the fact that European and 
Asian countries are competing with the United States to be world leaders in scientific innovation). 
 157. Id. at 2 (discussing the relationship between American innovation and America’s status as 
a world power). 
 158. See supra Part I. 
 159. See Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in 
Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 108 (2005) (“[D]isputes over the 
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patentability debate by almost eighty years.160 Because of the similarities 
between plant patents and human gene patents, it is informative to analyze 
the effects of governmental involvement in plant patentability.  
Beginning in the late 1800s,161 the difficulty involved in obtaining 
patent protection for new varieties of plants “derail[ed] innovation in this 
field.”162 A major source of this difficulty was the inability of inventors to 
satisfy the written description requirement for utility patents under 35 
U.S.C. § 112.163 In order to more effectively benefit the public through 
production of a stable food supply, Congress enacted the Townsend–
Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA).164 The PPA effectively abolished 
the written description requirement for asexually reproduced plants, 
requiring instead that inventors deposit a plant specimen at the USPTO.165 
By providing inventors with patent rights, Congress financially 
incentivized the invention of novel plant breeds. As intended, the promise 
of plant patent protection resulted in an increase in scientific research 
related to asexually reproduced plant varieties.166 
While the PPA spurred scientific research on asexually reproduced 
plants, it did nothing to incentivize research on sexually reproduced plant 
varieties.167 Because the seed and agriculture industries depend mostly on 
sexually reproduced plants, the PPA did not effectively promote 
development in these fields.168 In order to stimulate the development of 
novel, sexually reproduced plant varieties, Congress enacted the Plant 
                                                                                                                     
ownership of plant genetic material have yielded some of the most emotionally explosive battles 
over intellectual property . . . .”). 
 160. For a discussion of the plant patentability debate, see Nicholas J. Seay, Protecting the 
Seeds of Innovation: Patenting Plants, 16 AIPLA Q. J. 418 (1989). 
 161.  See id. at 419–20. 
 162. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protection for 
Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture, 27 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 91 (1995) (discussing the difficulties associated with obtaining a plant 
patent prior to Congress’ passage of the Townsend–Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930). 
 163. In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must satisfy a written description requirement. 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2006). In the patent application, the inventor must adequately describe his invention. 
The purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor has actually 
invented and is in possession of what is claimed in the patent application. See Alison E. Cantor, 
Using the Written Description and Enablement Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 296–97 (2000); Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark 
Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 335 (2004) (stating that “a patent’s claims must 
be interpreted in light of the patent’s written description of the invention”); see also Elisa Rives, 
Comment, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and Their Progeny 
Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 187, 198 (2001) (discussing 
the difficulties that inventors faced when attempting to patent novel plant varieties). 
 164. Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64 
(2006)). 
 165. See Rives, supra note 163, at 197–99. 
 166. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 143, at 93 (discussing the increase in plant patents 
issued in the decades following the enactment of the PPA). 
 167. See Rives, supra note 163, at 199. 
 168. Id. at 199–200. 
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Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA).169 Based on the PVPA, the United 
States Secretary of Agriculture may issue a certificate to a plant breeder 
who creates a novel, sexually reproduced plant.170 Similar to the PPA, the 
PVPA allows patent-like protection to an inventor who deposits a seed 
specimen at the Department of Agriculture.171 Congress included two 
exemptions to the PVPA certificate holder’s property rights in order to 
balance the interests of the consumer and the seed industry: the Farmers’ 
Privilege and the Research Exemption.172  
The Farmers’ Privilege,173 which allowed farmers to save and sell seeds 
from their crops, was a point of contention between farmers and seed 
growers. The Privilege allowed farmers to maximize profits at the expense 
of the seed companies’ intellectual property interests. In 1994, under 
pressure from the seed industry, Congress amended the PVPA to 
significantly narrow the Farmer’s Privilege such that farmers are now only 
able to save seeds for replanting, rather than sell them.174  
According to the Research Exemption, “[t]he use and reproduction of a 
protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not 
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under [the 
PVPA].”175 The Research Exemption allows researchers to perform studies 
on PVPA-certified seeds, thereby promoting the advancement of 
agricultural biotechnology. This Exemption does not allow researchers to 
profit from “hybrid or different variet[ies]” of the certified seed, but allows 
them to use certified seeds as a “stepping stone[] to develop new 
varieties.”176 
As intended, the passage of the PVPA promoted innovation in sexually 
reproduced agriculture. Protection of seed companies’ intellectual property 
rights enabled the companies to financially benefit from the creation of 
new plant varieties, which led to increased investment in the field.177 
Within ten years of the enactment of the PVPA, “three times as many 
wheat and soybean and six times as many cotton varieties were developed 
than in the decade prior to the Act’s passage.”178 
As previously discussed, one of the driving forces behind Congress’ 
passage of plant patent or certificate legislation was the inability of plant 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2006). 
 170. See id. § 2483. 
 171. See id. § 2422(2). 
 172. See Rives, supra note 163, at 201–04 (discussing both exemptions). 
 173.  7 U.S.C. § 2543.  
 174. Rives, supra note 163, at 201–03. 
 175. Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal Appropriability in 
Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1409 (1996) (quoting 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2544). 
 176. See Rives, supra note 163, at 204. 
 177. See Edmund J. Sease & Robert A. Hodgson, Plants are Properly Patentable Under 
Prevailing U.S. Law and This is Good Public Policy, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 327, 330 (2006) 
(discussing the effect of the PPA and the PVPA on “new plant innovations and varieties”). 
 178. Id. 
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breeders to satisfy the written description requirement necessary to obtain a 
utility patent. As genetic engineering and identification techniques 
advanced, researchers became more able to adequately describe various 
plant breeds based on the plants’ genetic sequences.179 This development, 
combined with the judicial attitude regarding the patentability of genetic 
material,180 allowed plant breeders to adequately satisfy the written 
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and obtain plant utility patents. 
Recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the idea that genetically modified 
plants are intellectual property, protectable via utility patents.181 The ability 
of breeders to acquire a wider scope of protection through utility patents 
has “stimulated investment in the development and marketing of 
commercial [seed] varieties, such as genetically modified corn, soybeans, 
and cotton . . . .”182 In the last several decades, plant biotechnology 
innovation has advanced at a faster pace than the rate of advancement of all 
other technologies combined.183 
In many respects, the plant patenting debate mirrors the human gene 
patenting debate. Agricultural innovation can increase crop yields, 
maximize food nutritional value, preserve the environment, and stabilize 
farmers’ outputs. Additionally, agricultural biotechnology can solve many 
global issues, such as food shortages and decreased biodiversity.184 
Nonetheless, scholars and researchers are concerned that the “tragedy of 
the anticommons” is affecting the agriculture industry.185 Because utility 
patents do not contain a research exemption, scientists are concerned that 
the growing number of plant-related utility patents will inhibit their 
research.186 Furthermore, an increase in plant patent protection has resulted 
                                                                                                                     
 179. See Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. Seed 
Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 315 (1999) (discussing the impact that advances in genetic 
engineering had on the ability of plant breeders to obtain plant utility patents). 
 180. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that genetically 
modified bacteria are patentable); Ex parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985) 
(holding that plants are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101).  
 181. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001) 
(holding that “[t]he plain meaning of § 101, as interpreted by this Court in Chakrabarty, clearly 
includes plants within its subject matter”). 
 182. Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African 
Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 346 (2004) (discussing the 
impact of plant utility patents on agricultural innovation). 
 183. Since 1981, the number of patents issued to plant biotechnology per year has increased 
almost nine-fold. In the same timeframe, “overall utility patents per year slightly more than 
doubled.” Id. at 347. 
 184. See Mary Lynne Kupchella, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology: Why It Can Save the 
Environment and Developing Nations, but May Never Get a Chance, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 721, 721 (2001) (citing Gordon Conway, Biotech Can Feed the World, or Divide It, 
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 19, 1999, at 9B). 
 185. See Taylor & Cayford, supra note 182, at 349–50 (discussing how “patent thickets” 
inhibit innovation). 
 186. Id. (noting that the largest research barriers “are simple refusals by [patent] owners to 
license [the patented technology]”); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified 
Foods, and IP Overreaching, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the propensity of 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/6
2011] THE FORGOTTEN VICTIM IN THE HUMAN GENE PATENTING DEBATE 1299 
 
in a decrease in farmers’ planting rights.187 Farmers are outraged by the 
fact that patent laws prevent them from “saving seed,”188 the high prices 
they are forced to pay to obtain seeds of superior plant varieties,189 and the 
ways in which genetic engineering has altered the farming culture.190 
The last century of agricultural development teaches several lessons 
that can be applied to the human gene patenting debate: increased 
intellectual property protection results in increased innovation;191 
innovation can be manipulated by legislation;192 and the process of finding 
a legislative balance that appeases both consumers and industries can be 
lengthy. Interestingly, the plant patent debate began in a time when 
breeders were afforded zero protection for their inventions, and legislation 
was used to promote innovation and protection of breeders’ intellectual 
property. The opposite is true in the human gene patenting debate: the 
starting point is one in which intellectual property is afforded maximum 
protection, and the general public wishes to rein in this protection. 
B.  The Hatch–Waxman Act: Legislation Regulating Pharmaceutical 
Drugs 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress had seemingly 
contradictory concerns: that the patent law system inadequately promoted 
pharmaceutical innovation and that the price of pharmaceuticals was 
skyrocketing.193 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
                                                                                                                     
seed licenses to prohibit crop research). 
 187. See Kelly T. Crosby, The United States and Iraq: Plant Patent Protection and Saving 
Seed, 9 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 511, 511 (2010) (discussing the fact that patent law favors 
large businesses). 
 188. Id. (quoting Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around 
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 96 n.10 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Adam Liptak, Saving Seeds Subjects Farmers to Suits over 
Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/us/saving-seeds-subjects-
farmers-to-suits-over-patent.html?scp=45&sq=monsanto+%26+farmer&st=nyt (discussing patent 
infringement suits between farmers and seed companies). 
 189. See William Neuman, Rapid Rise in Seed Prices Draws U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/12seed.html?pagewanted=1&sq=monsanto 
%20&st=nyt&%20farmer&scp=19 (discussing the effect of seed company monopolies on seed 
prices). 
 190. See Verlyn Klinkenborg, Editorial Observer: Biotechnology and the Future of 
Agriculture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/08/ 
opinion/editorial-observer-biotechnology-and-the-future-of-agriculture.html?scp=48&sq=monsanto 
+%26+farmer&st=nyt (arguing that farmers, not biotechnology companies, should be responsible 
for improving crops). 
 191. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 162, at 93; Sease & Hodgson, supra note 177, at 330. 
 192. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 
(2006). 
 193. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch–Waxman Act: History, 
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590 (2003); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 187, 188 (1999) (providing an overview of the Hatch–Waxman Act’s legislative genesis). 
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(FDCA)194 created the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and gave it 
the authority to ensure the safety of any “new drug” before the drug was 
used in commerce.195 In 1962, the FDCA was amended196 to require a drug 
manufacturer to illustrate the effectiveness of its drug prior to FDA 
approval.197 This new “effectiveness requirement” required a manufacturer 
to submit “substantial evidence” of the drug’s effectiveness through 
administration of the drug in multiple clinical studies.198 Because 
manufacturers typically obtained patents as early in the research process as 
possible, the “effectiveness requirement” drastically shortened the period 
of time that the innovator could benefit from patent exclusivity.199 In 
effect, “the 1962 Amendments . . . increase[d] the research costs of 
innovator firms and . . . reduce[d] the time they stood to benefit from the 
investment.”200 This increased cost was ultimately passed on to the 
consumer, resulting in price increases for many prescription drugs.201 
By the early 1980s, the nation struggled to find its place in the trilemma 
created by consumer health,202 consumer budget,203 and promotion of 
prescription drug innovation.204 With the goal of reconciling these 
competing interests, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman Act).205 In order to 
incentivize innovation, the Hatch–Waxman Act allows drug manufacturers 
to recoup patent term exclusivity for a period of time “equal to the 
‘regulatory review period for the approved product.’”206 The Hatch–
Waxman Act also provides inventors with additional periods of market 
exclusivity for certain types of drug innovations.207 Simultaneously, the 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)). 
 195. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 587. 
 196. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 197. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 587–88. 
 198. Id. (quoting § 102(c), 76 Stat. at 781) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199. Following the 1962 Amendments, “the FDA require[d] 10 to 15 years of preapproval 
[research and development] after a patent application [was] filed.” Sherry M. Knowles, Fixing the 
Legal Framework for Pharmaceutical Research, 327 SCI. 1083, 1083 (2010). 
 200. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 588. 
 201. Id. at 590. 
 202. The “effectiveness requirement” ensured that every commercial pharmaceutical drug 
benefited the health of the consumer. Id. at 588. 
 203. Consumer budget relates to the escalating costs of prescription medications. Id. at 590. 
 204. For a discussion of how to balance these competing interests, see James Thuo Gathii, 
Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating 
Access to Affordable Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727 (2001). 
 205. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). 
 206. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 590–91 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2000)) 
(explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act allows manufacturers to extend patent exclusivity to a 
maximum of five years). 
 207. Id. at 591–93 (discussing extended periods of market exclusivity that are provided for 
discovery of new chemical entities and new clinical investigations). 
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Act promotes consumers’ interests by increasing their access to generic 
pharmaceutical drugs.208 If a generic drug is the “same” or “bioequivalent” 
to an FDA-approved brand name drug, then the generic drug manufacturer 
will be allowed to undergo expedited FDA approval.209 Under expedited 
approval, the generic manufacturer is not required to go through clinical 
testing for the product.210 Furthermore, the Hatch–Waxman Act provides a 
research exemption for generic manufacturers, allowing them to 
“experiment with patented brand-name drugs in order to establish the 
bioequivalency of generic drug substitutes and thereby obtain FDA 
approval of the generic drugs prior to the expiration of the brand-name 
patents.”211 This exemption allows generic drugs to hit the marketplace the 
day after the brand-name drug patent expires.212 Patients therefore have 
access to generic-drug prices earlier than they would have previously. 
Because of this, “the Hatch-Waxman Act effectively establish[ed] a robust 
generic drug industry in the United States.”213 
By adequately balancing the competing concerns of the consumer, the 
generic drug manufacturer, and the pharmaceutical company, the Hatch–
Waxman Act214 has successfully achieved Congress’ goals.215 The generic 
drug market has escalated since the passage of the Act,216 yet market 
incentives continue to spur pharmaceutical innovation.217 Since the Act’s 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See id. at 593–95 (describing the abbreviated approval process for generic drugs).  
 209. Id. at 594; see also Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical 
Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1013–14 (2010) 
(discussing the Act’s goal of promoting competition). 
 210. See Knowles, supra note 199, at 1083. 
 211. Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on 
Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483, 504 (2006). More recently, the effectiveness of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is further increased by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271’s 
safe harbor provision, which the Court has extended to “all uses of patented inventions that are 
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information [to the FDA].” Rowe, 
supra note 186, at 127 n.246 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 
202 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s intepretation of this provision allows 
experimentation on patented drugs as long as the experimentation is related to “submission to the 
FDA.” Id. Because of this expansive intepretation, patent holders “must tolerate the infringing 
activities of competitors who conduct FDA approval tests prior to the expiration of the patent 
terms.” Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimential Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do 
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 933 (2006). 
 212. See Mossinghoff, supra note 193, at 190.  
 213. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 906. 
 214. Only select provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act have been discussed in this Note. As a 
whole, the Hatch–Waxman Act is “one of the most complex disciplines in the entirety of legal 
practice.” Id. 
 215. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 586. 
 216. See Laura W. Musselwhite & Jane Andrews, Protect Pharmaceutical Innovation, 328 
SCI. 1354, 1354 (2010) (stating that in 2010, generic pharmaceuticals comprised 70% of the 
pharmaceutical market); see also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607 (stating that the 
generic drug market has increased “from 19 percent of the total pharmaceutical market in 1984 to 
more than 47 percent [in 2003]”).  
 217. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607 (explaining that over $32 billion was spent 
on research and development in 2003). 
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inception, the increased presence of generic pharmaceuticals on the market 
has saved the American healthcare system over $730 billion.218 
Simultaneously, “the enactment of Hatch-Waxman . . . has helped unleash 
unprecedented investment in new drug research and development, which in 
turn has led to a period of unparalleled pharmaceutical innovation.”219  
Regardless of the success of the Act, it continues to be a matter of 
intense debate.220 Generic manufacturers believe that the Act impedes 
generic entry into the marketplace.221 Pharmaceutical companies believe 
that the Act does not adequately compensate innovators for the time lost to 
the FDA approval process.222 Since its inception, the Hatch–Waxman Act 
has been amended multiple times,223 and is still considered to be a work in 
progress.224 
VI.  SOLVING THE HUMAN GENE PATENTING PROBLEM 
Much can be learned from the successful implementation of both the 
PVPA and the Hatch–Waxman Act, specifically in regards to research 
exemptions of patented technologies. Despite these exemptions, both plant 
research under the PVPA and prescription drug research under the Hatch–
Waxman Act have thrived at unprecedented levels.225 Regarding the 
human gene patenting debate, the Advisory Committee of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services has suggested that infringement liability 
exemptions should be implemented with respect to both medical 
professionals and researchers.226 Allowing medical professionals to 
perform genetic testing without infringement would undercut the financial 
incentive of human gene research and ultimately result in decreased 
investment in the pharmaceutical industry. However, the adverse effects of 
a research exemption on a patent holder’s financial gain would be far less 
threatening to the pharmaceutical industry. History has shown that 
                                                                                                                     
 218.  Musselwhite & Andrews, supra note 116, at 1354. 
 219. Pillman, India Needs Its Hatch-Waxman Act for Healthcare, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS, 
May 15, 2009, http://www.dnaindia.com/money/column_india-needs-its-hatch-waxman-act-for-
healthcare_1256132 (statement of Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO of Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: 
Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 750–51 (2002) (discussing an 
increased number of lawsuits resulting from the Hatch–Waxman Act). 
 221. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607.  
 222. See Knowles, supra note 199, at 1083–84. 
 223. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)); see also Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)); Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. 
L. No. 100-670, 102 Stat. 3971 (1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).  
 224. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607–08 (discussing what types of reform 
efforts to Hatch-Waxman might be successful). 
 225. See supra Part V. 
 226. See SACGHS, supra note 100, at 94–95. 
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pharmaceutical economics can coexist with research exemptions on 
patented technologies.227 Legislation that allows research on patented 
human genes yet still allows infringement suits for any commercialization 
based on this research, would simultaneously promote the interests of both 
the consumer and the industry. 
Many other ideas for how to fix the human gene patenting problem 
have been suggested, such as: compulsory licensing of patented genetic 
material,228 promotion of increased transparency in licensing standards,229 
and restriction of the scope of patent protection.230 While these suggestions 
adequately protect the interests of consumers and researchers discussed in 
Parts II and III of this Note, they fail to effectively protect the interests of 
patent holders. In many of these academic proposals, the interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry have been largely ignored. Legislation that reduces 
patent holder rights will deter innovation, so provisions benefitting patent 
holders must be included. Furthermore, unless proposed legislation 
provides tangible benefits to the pharmaceutical industry, it is unlikely to 
be voted into law.231 Similar to the Hatch–Waxman Act, the ideal human 
gene patent legislation would provide benefits to both the consumer and 
the industry.  
Several legislative courses of action would compensate the 
pharmaceutical industry for allowing researchers to be exempted from 
                                                                                                                     
 227. See supra Part V. 
 228. See Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 
18413, 18413–15 (proposed Apr. 11, 2005) (suggesting that compulsory nonexclusive or exclusive 
licensing procedures would benefit public welfare); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND 
DEV., GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF GENETIC INVENTIONS 9 (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/38/36198812.pdf (discussing implementing broad licensing 
requirements for research and investigation purposes). Generally, compulsory licensing would allow 
use of a patented invention if the use serves some beneficial public policy. See Jacqueline Lipton, 
Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 163–64 (2004). 
 229. See SACGHS, supra note 100, at 99 (discussing how transparency in licensing 
requirements provides a degree of certainty to the research community). 
 230. See Marisa Noelle Pins, Note, Impeding Access to Quality Patient Care and Patient 
Rights: How Myriad Genetics’ Gene Patents Are Unknowingly Killing Cancer Patients and How to 
Calm the Ripple Effect, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 377, 412–13 (2010) (discussing the possibility of 
limiting the scope of patents associated with certain genetic conditions). 
 231. See Dan Eggen, The Health Sector Has Donated Millions to Lawmakers, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 8, 2009, at A09 (discussing campaign contributions made by the pharmaceutical industry and 
expressing “concern . . . that money is buying influence and policy changes” (citing Jerry Flanagan, 
Consumer Watchdog healthcare advocate) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also AMS. FOR 
CAMPAIGN REFORM, FACT SHEET: MONEY IN POLITICS & PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2010), available at 
http://www.acrreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Fact-Sheet-Pharmaceutical-Money-in-
Politics1.pdf (stating that the pharmaceutical industry has invested nearly $2 billion in lobbying and 
contributions to Congressional campaigns). See generally Filipe R. Campante, Redistribution in a 
Model of Voting and Campaign Contributions 32–33 (Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. 
RWP07-045, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1019020 
(finding a link between voting and campaign contributions); Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Geoff 
Edwards, Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory 
Outcomes in Telecommunications, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 547, 569 (2007) (finding that 
“private money in the form of campaign contributions can influence public policy outcomes”). 
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infringement liability. The most drastic measure would be a patent term 
extension for human gene patents. Research exemptions, medical 
professional exemptions, compulsory licensing, or any of the other 
proposed courses of action would result in decreased profits for patent 
holders. In order to effectively promote innovation despite this decrease in 
patent holder rights, the ideal pro-pharmaceutical legislation would extend 
the period of patent exclusivity. This could be done either by adjusting the 
start date of the patent term232 or by adding years to the end of the term in a 
manner similar to the Hatch–Waxman legislation. Extending the patent 
term by several years could adequately compensate the patent holder for 
these lost profits.  
Another option is to provide the pharmaceutical industry with increased 
tax credit incentives. On December 17, 2010, the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 
went into effect.233 This Act extends, through the end of 2011, the active 
period of an earlier tax credit designed to refund businesses for their 
research and development spending.234 This tax credit was initially 
implemented in 1981 and has been extended fourteen times since its initial 
enactment.235 For years, the pharmaceutical industry has been lobbying for 
Congress to make this tax credit permanent,236 arguing that it would 
promote job growth and provide a level of certainty for investors.237 In 
providing the pharmaceutical industry with a permanent or increased 
financial incentive, the tax credit may counterbalance the concessions that 
the general public is demanding of the pharmaceutical industry. 
A third option is to increase government funding of private research. In 
1988, Congress passed the Advanced Technology Program (ATP)238 “to 
foster cooperation among government, industry, and academia to facilitate 
the generation of new technologies and techniques for the commercial 
                                                                                                                     
 232. A patent is valid for twenty years from the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
For human gene patents, beginning the patent term at the time of issuance (as opposed to the time of 
filing) would extend the term of patent exclusivity in a manner that would adequately compensate 
inventors for decreased patent holder rights associated with compulsory licensing or research 
exemptions. 
 233. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010) (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. § 41).  
 234. Id. 
 235.  See Karen Axelton, Will the R&D Tax Credit Be Extended Again?, NETWORK SOLUTIONS 
SMALL BUS. BLOG (Apr. 21, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.networksolutions.com/smallbusiness/ 
2011/04/will-the-rd-tax-credit-be-extended-again/. 
 236. See Erik Greb, Is PhRMA Credible About the R&D Tax Credit?, PHARMATECH TALK (Oct. 
4, 2010, 9:49 AM), http://blog.pharmtech.com/2010/10/04/is-phrma-credible-about-the-rd-tax-
credit (discussing “the pharmaceutical industry’s legislative priorities”). 
 237. See Grant Gross, Obama Calls for Permanent R&D Tax Credit, NETWORK WORLD (Sept. 
8, 2010, 4:23 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/090810-obama-calls-for-permanent-
rd.html (discussing the benefits to the pharmaceutical industry of a permanent R&D tax credit). 
 238. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 
1115, repealed by America Competes Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572, 593.  
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market.”239 Through ATP, large pharmaceutical companies were able to 
secure federal funds to offset research and development costs. At its height, 
ATP was funded at $431 million per year.240 Despite the overwhelming 
success of the program,241 by 2006, Congress had decreased funding to 
ATP by over 40%.242 In 2007, Congress replaced ATP with the 
Technology Innovation Program (TIP),243 which federally funds innovative 
research in “small and medium-sized businesses.”244 In 2009, TIP was 
funded at $65 million,245 far less than federal funding of private research 
during the peak ATP years. While TIP may not discourage innovation, it 
does nothing to incentivize innovation at large pharmaceutical companies. 
Allowing large companies to reap the benefits of public funding would 
help offset the innovation deterrence caused by the passage of pro-
consumer legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent Myriad I and Myriad II decisions have brought the human 
gene patenting debate to center stage. By ruling in a manner that is 
inconsistent with both case law and USPTO policy, the Myriad I court took 
the first step toward effectuating change in the human gene patenting field. 
By failing to reach a consensus on the reasoning behind, or scope of, 
human gene patenting, the Myriad II court has intensified the need for 
certainty in the gene patenting field. Furthermore, the United States 
government’s participation in the appeals procedure indicates the necessity 
of a change to human gene patenting policy. The debate among 
researchers, consumers, and pharmaceutical companies is exacerbated by 
the moral and ethical implications of the field. In this context in particular, 
spurring innovation is essential, not just because of the intimate 
relationship between innovation and national prosperity, but also because 
of the direct impact of innovation on consumer health. Legislation 
curtailing patent holder rights should therefore simultaneously stimulate 
innovation.  
The Hatch–Waxman Act provides the best example of patent-related 
legislation that simultaneously benefits seemingly competing interests.246 
While pro-consumer regulation of human gene patents has been 
                                                                                                                     
 239. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-36 SPR, THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
PROGRAM 1 (2007) [hereinafter ATP]. 
 240. Id. at 3. 
 241. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22815, THE TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
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 242. See ATP, supra note 239, at 3. 
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extensively discussed, pro-pharmaceutical provisions to any proposed 
legislation have been largely overlooked.247 Fortunately, there are many 
ways to continue to incentivize innovation while simultaneously reducing 
patent holder rights, including extending patent terms, increasing or 
stabilizing tax incentives, and increasing the scope of federal funding of 
private research. Ideally, increased concessions on the part of the 
pharmaceutical industry should be paired with a correlated increase in 
benefits afforded to the industry. Large concessions, such as compulsory 
nonexclusive licensing, should be paired with large incentives, such as 
extended patent terms. Minor concessions, such as a narrow research 
exemption, should be paired with minor incentives, such as a slight 
increase to federal funding of private research. 
If the histories of plant and pharmaceutical drug patents teach us 
anything, it is this: there is no magic bullet. Finding an adequate solution to 
the problem is a lengthy process: both plant and drug patent legislation 
have been through multiple amendments to get where they are today. 
Congressional human gene patent legislation that is simultaneously pro-
consumer and pro-pharmaceutical is the best way to start down the path to 
a compromise that consumers, researchers, and the pharmaceutical industry 
will all find acceptable. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 247. See supra Part VI. 
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